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Proposal for a 
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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
In the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2007
1
 and revised in 
Luxembourg on 25 June 2005
2
 (the Cotonou Agreement) the Parties recognised that the 
instability of export earnings could be prejudicial to the development of the ACP States and 
compromise the achievement of their development aims. A system of additional support 
(Flex) was therefore established in order to mitigate the adverse effects of any instability in 
export earnings, in accordance with Article 68(1) of the Cotonou Agreement. 
However, Flex does not seem to be achieving all its objectives owing to various 
methodological and operational problems, and the ACP States submitted a proposal to amend 
it in January 2005
3
. Since this amendment was not dealt with in the framework of the 
five-year revision of the Cotonou Agreement, it was agreed that the Commission and the ACP 
Group would examine the proposal at a later date
4
. 
The Commission agrees with the analysis that there are flaws in the Flex instrument (but not 
necessarily with the solutions advocated by the ACP Group) and a substantial revision is 
therefore needed in order to help achieve the objectives laid down in Article 68. This revision 
will embrace both the eligibility criteria and technical aspects with a view to clarifying the 
indicators used, the disbursement period and the counter-cyclical nature of Flex funding. 
In accordance with Article 100 of the Cotonou Agreement, Annex II may be revised by 
decision of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers. In view of this, the Commission recommends 
that the Council and the Member States authorise the Commission to negotiate the revision of 
the Flex cooperation instrument with the ACP Group. 
1. PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED REVISION 
The purpose of the support in cases of short-term fluctuations in export earnings provided for 
in Article 68(2) of the Cotonou Agreement is: "... to safeguard socio-economic reforms and 
policies that could be affected negatively as a result of a drop in [export] revenue and to 
remedy the adverse effects of instability of export earnings, in particular from agricultural 
and mining products ...". 
The Flex instrument is not, therefore, designed to compensate directly for losses of export 
earnings but to mitigate their adverse impact on economic potential and to protect expenditure 
in social sectors. 
During the initial years of implementation of the Flex instrument a number of methodological 
and operational problems came to light. These problems significantly reduce the effectiveness 
of the instrument. In particular, Flex loses its counter-cyclical impact because implementation 
                                                 
1
 OJ L 317, 15.12.2000. 
2
 OJ L 287, 28.10.2005. 
3
 "Proposed Amendments to the Cotonou Agreement under the FLEX", document ACP/85/017/04, Rev. 
5 of 8 December 2004, submitted to DG DEV on 17 January 2005. 
4
 Declaration II of the Final Act of the Agreement signed in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 - Joint 
declaration on Article 68 of the Cotonou Agreement: "The ACP-EC Council of Ministers will examine, 
in application of the provisions contained in Article 100 of the Cotonou Agreement, the proposals of the 
ACP side concerning Annex II thereof on short-term fluctuations in export earnings." 
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takes a long time.In addition, Flex is financed from the B envelopes for unforeseen needs
5
 
which under the 9th EDF led to problems of access to Flex support when the B envelope was 
exhausted. 
The three main factors that affect the implementation of Flex, namely the eligibility criteria, 
the method of calculating and mobilising Flex funds and the source of financing, must 
therefore be thoroughly revised. 
2. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 
Currently access to Flex is subject to two eligibility criteria that are applied cumulatively: one 
concerns the fluctuation in export earnings and the other the theoretical impact on the public 
budget deficit. There are problems in interpretation which justify updating both criteria, 
without, however, calling into question the underlying philosophy. 
2.1. Greater number of countries enjoying special treatment 
Currently, the first eligibility criterion for Flex runs as follows
6
:  
"- a 10% (2% in the case of least-developed, landlocked and island States) loss of export 
earnings from goods compared with the arithmetical average of the earnings in the first three 
years of the first four years preceding the application year; 
or - a 10% (2% in the case of least-developed, landlocked and island States) loss of export 
earnings from the total of agricultural or mineral products compared with the arithmetical 
average of the earnings in the first three years of the first four years preceding the application 
year for countries where the agricultural or mineral export revenues represent more than 40 
% of total export revenues from goods;". 
When the Cotonou Agreement was revised, the number of countries entitled to more 
favourable treatment at the 2% threshold was extended to include "post-conflict and 
post-natural disaster" countries (Article 68(3) of the Cotonou Agreement). 
It is proposed to amend Article 9 of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement to reflect the 
broadening of the definition of countries satisfying the criterion at the lower threshold to 
include post-conflict and post-natural disaster countries.  
2.2. Reference period 
The reference period currently used to calculate the fluctuation in export earnings is years N-4 
to N-2. It is proposed to include the last year preceding (N-1) the application year (N) in 
the reference period since these figures have to be provided by the partner country in any 
case. 
Moreover, given the recurrent nature of the fluctuations, the reference period may include 
"extreme" figures and so not reflect the trend.  
Quantified examples for the years N-4, N-3, N-2, N-1, N: 
                                                 
5
 Article 3(2 )(b) of Annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement. 
6
 Article 9(1)(a) of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement. 
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• 50, 53, 92, 59, 62 = favourable trend but the country is eligible for Flex since the average 
in question (N-4, N-3, N-2) is 65, and the exports of the application year are less than 98% 
of this average. 
• 50, 41, 53, 56, 48 = negative fluctuation with regard to the trend but the country is eligible 
for Flex since the average in question (N-4, N-3, N-2) is 48, and the exports of the 
application year are more than 98% of this average. 
The ACP Group asked for a six-year reference period from which the greatest and smallest 
values would be excluded. This proposal puts more emphasis on structural trends against the 
instrument's focus on short-term fluctuations in the general trend. 
It is proposed to amend Article 9 of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement in order to take as 
the reference period the four years preceding the application year and to exclude from the 
calculation the year with the "most extreme" figures, i.e. the year with export earnings that are 
furthest from the average
7
. 
2.3. Currency used 
Hitherto the export losses have been systematically calculated in euro. Inflation and 
exchange-rate variations of countries that have a currency pegged to the American dollar or 
another reference currency and/or countries the bulk of whose trade is done in a reference 
currency other than the euro can, however, have a significant impact on the eligibility. For 
example, St Lucia's currency, the East Caribbean dollar, has had a fixed exchange rate with 
the American dollar for 30 years and most of its international trade is denominated in 
American dollars; it would not have been eligible in 2004 if the figures had been calculated in 
local currency. 
It is proposed to analyse the fluctuations in export earnings in local currency corrected for 
inflation (consumer price index or gross domestic product deflator). 
It is proposed to add a paragraph with a reference to the choice of currency to the new 
Article 9a of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement. 
2.4. Elimination of the second eligibility criterion 
The second eligibility criterion for receiving additional resources is "a 2% worsening in the 
programmed public deficit programmed for the year in question or forecast for the following 
year
8
." In order to calculate the theoretical impact of a loss of export earnings on the 
government budget, a simplified formula is adopted whereby exports contribute to the 
government budget in the same proportion as to GDP. The worsening of the public deficit 
following a loss of export earnings is thus calculated as follows:  
                                                 
7
 To return to the first example, average export earnings in the years N-4 to N-1 are 63.6 and the extreme 
value in relation to this average is that of year N-2. If the average of years N-4, N-3 and N-1 is 
recalculated, a value of 54 is obtained and the country is logically no longer eligible for Flex. In the 
second example, the average N-4 to N-1 is 50, the extreme value is that of year N-3, and the average 
excluding the extreme value is 53, making the country eligible for Flex. 
8
 Article 9(1)(b) of Annex II of the Cotonou Agreement. The deficit is defined in the Commission's 
guidelines as "the central government deficit (overall balance excluding grants)". 
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"Worsening of the public deficit = (value of export losses in year N) x (average ratio 
revenues/GDP in years N-4, N-3, N-2)" (operational guidelines for Flex, 2005). 
The need for this criterion has been questioned by the ACP States and by the Commission in 
its 2004 proposal. There are several reasons for abandoning this criterion: 
• the impact of losses of export earnings on government budgets (and therefore on a 
government's capacity to pursue its development policies) is difficult to establish. The 
structure (private/public, concentrated or not, etc.) and taxation of an export sector can 
vary widely from one country to the next. The loss of export earnings in N may have an 
impact on the budget in N or in N+1, depending on the tax system and at what point in the 
fiscal year the losses of export earnings materialise. Similarly, the quality of 
macroeconomic management and the grip on public finances will also influence the 
budgetary impact of an external shock such as a fluctuation in export earnings. The real 
impact of any instability of export earnings on the effective budgetary situation therefore 
varies considerably in relation to the country's circumstances, and the current approach 
might appear to offer an incentive to less rigorous management of public finances. 
• the arbitrary choice of a 2% worsening of the deficit skews the results. A country which 
already has a substantial programmed deficit will, all things being equal, have more 
difficulty in gaining access to Flex than a country with a smaller programmed deficit
9
. 
• the figures of the forecast deficits on which the eligibility calculation is based may be quite 
different from the final data.  
It is therefore proposed to delete the second eligibility criterion in Article 9 of Annex II to 
the Cotonou Agreement. 
2.5. Addition of a condition to the first eligibility criterion 
In deleting the second allocation criterion, we must also take steps to avoid a proliferation of 
Flex awards for quite small amounts that do not affect the country's macroeconomic stability 
and its capacity to pursue its reforms and socio-economic policies.  
In order to focus our aid on the countries most affected by losses in export earnings, it is 
proposed to amend Article 9 of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement so as to restrict 
interventions to situations where the loss in export earnings is more than 0.7% of GDP
10
. 
2.6. Number of successive years 
Currently a country can have access to Flex for four successive years
11
.  
                                                 
9
 For example, a country with a programmed deficit of 2% of GDP will be eligible if the worsening of the 
deficit following the loss of export earnings is calculated as equivalent to 0.04% of GDP. On the other 
hand, a country with a programmed deficit (excluding grants) of 20% would require a worsening 
equivalent to 0.4% of GDP to have the possibility of access to Flex. So in practice it is mostly countries 
with a small budget deficit (estimated) that are eligible. 
10
 The threshold of 0.7% was calculated using the following assumption: loss in export earnings 2% and 
exports' share of GDP 35% (which corresponds to the ACP countries' average for 2000-2005). This 
threshold favours countries whose exports account for a bigger share of GDP and/or whose export 
earnings are the most volatile without penalising the poorest countries with a tax or parafiscal base that 
accounts for a very small percentage of GDP. 
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It is proposed to amend Article 9(2) of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement in order to 
restrict access to Flex to three successive years in line with Article 68 of the Cotonou 
Agreement which refers to "short-term fluctuations in export earnings" and not to structural 
trends towards a fall in export earnings. 
3. METHOD OF CALCULATING AND MOBILISING FLEX 
3.1. Budgetary impact 
If an ACP country satisfies the eligibility criteria, the maximum financial support it can 
receive under Flex (subject to the availability of funds in the B envelope of the country 
concerned, see point 4) is currently equal to the estimated worsening of the programmed 
public deficit. Given the problem of the bias resulting from use of the "budget deficit" as 
reference point (see point 2.5), it would be wiser to refer to budgetary impact rather than 
deficit. In order to concentrate the FLEX intervention in the countries less well armed to face 
fluctuations in export earnings, and in particular countries with relatively weak central 
government revenue excluding grants, it is proposed to cap the interventions in the countries 
whose share of those revenues in GDP is above the ACP average. 
It is proposed to add an Article 9a to Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement for the purpose of 
reformulating the way support is calculated and limiting it to the theoretical budgetary 
impact, defined as follows: 
"Theoretical budgetary impact = value of export losses in year N multiplied by the average of 
the "revenue/GDP ratio for the years N-4, N-3, N-2 and N -1, excluding the most extreme 
value and capping that ratio at 25%", where revenue is central government revenue, 
excluding grants. 
The value of the losses in export earnings is calculated in local currency corrected for 
inflation, as the difference between the earnings in year N and the arithmetical average of 
earnings for the years N-4, N-3, N-2, N-1, excluding the year with the most extreme value. 
The value of the losses in export earnings is then converted in euro at the exchange rate 
applicable to the year N. 
3.2. Methods of releasing financial support 
Currently, the implementation of support varies, depending on whether the country concerned 
is eligible or not for budgetary support. 
(a) Countries in receipt of budgetary support 
The countries eligible for budgetary support receive financial support in the form of general 
budgetary support to compensate for losses of export earnings, which is in line with Flex 
objectives. However, the disbursement period could be shortened. There is already a system 
for advancing up to 80% of the potential amount of financial support
12
. This system of 
advances is currently insufficiently exploited, especially as the final statistics for export 
                                                                                                                                                        
11
 Article 9(2) of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement. 
12
 Article 10 of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement. 
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earnings generally differ little or not at all from the provisional statistics on basis of which 
these advances may be made. 
It is proposed to amend Article 10 of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement so that payment of 
an advance is the rule and to raise the maximum amount of the advance to 100% of the 
potential amount of financial support. Typical scenario: cut-off date for Flex requests in the 
first half of year N+1, decision submitted to the EDF Committee and disbursement in the 
second half of the same year or possibly beginning of year N+2 at the latest. Recovery at a 
later date of any overpayment (if final statistics show that the loss of export earnings was not 
as large as forecast) would then be effected by offsetting the amount against the next payment 
of budgetary support. 
(b) Country not in receipt of budgetary support 
For countries where budgetary support is not planned, the amount is added to the country's 
National Indicative Programme (NIP) for new projects and programmes or for topping up 
existing projects and programmes. For these countries Flex financial support does not 
contribute directly to macroeconomic stabilisation and is not truly counter-cyclical in nature. 
Given the complexity of managing advances for projects, extending the advances system to 
countries not eligible for budgetary support is not recommended; it is better to wait for the 
final statistics for export earnings before allocating Flex financial support. 
However, efforts should be made to make more use of Flex to remedy the adverse effects of 
instability in export earnings and so encourage more systematic recourse to alternative 
mechanisms, as provided for in Article 68(5) of the Cotonou Agreement: "The Community 
shall also provide support for market-based insurance schemes designed for ACP States 
seeking to protect themselves against the risk of fluctuations in export earnings." 
It is proposed to amend Article 9 of Annex II to the Cotonou Agreement by adding a 
reference to market-based insurance schemes offering protection against the risk of 
fluctuations in export earnings. 
3.3. Countries without Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and special cases 
Flex is above all designed to safeguard socio-economic reforms and policies that could be 
affected negatively as a result of a drop in export revenue. This assumes that such a drop in 
export earnings is of external origin and that there is a government in place pursuing a policy 
of reform designed to improve the well-being of the local population. In the case of countries 
deemed "special" cases (e.g. countries without a signed CSP, and countries subject to 
appropriate measures in application of Articles 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement), this is 
not necessarily true. Access to Flex should be subject to the Council's political evaluation of 
the situation. 
It is therefore proposed that Flex be systematically taken into account whenever the Council 
decides to take appropriate measures in respect of a partner country in the framework of the 
political dialogue provided for in the Cotonou Agreement. 
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4. CREATION OF A FLEX ENVELOPE 
In the past, the fact that the amount of Flex financial support was limited by the amount and 
availability of funds in the B envelopes had a significant impact on the scale of Flex 
interventions. In the 2004 application year only €10.6 million of a potential total of 
€193.6 million was paid out. The average coverage rate of potential requirements was 21.5% 
between 2003 and 2005, reaching a maximum of 28% in 2003 (€81.5 million paid out). 
With the revision of the Cotonou Agreement it is now possible replenish the B envelopes in 
response to "special needs"
13
. The sums reserved for national cooperation under the 10th EDF 
are not enough, however, to cover Flex requirements up to the maximum theoretical 
budgetary impact (see point 3.1)
14
. This means that an objective, uniform and transparent 
method must be found to limit the share of B-envelope funds allocated to the Flex instrument. 
The proposed solution is to set a maximum annual Flex allocation for all the ACP States, 
as proposed in the course of the end-term review of the 2005 and 2006 application years. 
Given the funds available for the B envelopes under the 10th EDF, it is proposed not to 
increase the level of Flex funding significantly under this Fund. 
To take account of specific circumstances from one year to the next, it is proposed to allocate 
Flex a basic budget of €80 million, which may rise to €100 million if potential amounts of 
support look exceptionally high and the coverage rate were to fall below 33% of the potential 
amounts. This envelope corresponds to a coverage of about 35% to 45% of estimated 
effective needs over the last three years, close to the coverage rate of the estimated cost of the 
reform of the Community's sugar market for ACP signatories of the sugar protocol, and close 
to the maximum amount allocated to Flex under the 9th EDF. 
If the potential amount of Flex support exceeded the annual allocation, countries would 
receive Flex financial support in proportion to their potential eligibility. So as not to slow 
down the whole process, it is proposed to notify in year N+1, using provisional statistics, an 
amount for countries eligible for budgetary support which could be disbursed quickly (see 
point 3.3). Amounts for other countries will be notified on the basis of final statistics. 
It is proposed to include a paragraph in the new Article 9a of Annex II to the Cotonou 
Agreement providing for the creation of an overall annual envelope for Flex and the principle 
of its allocation in proportion to requirements. 
The Commission therefore proposes that the Council adopts the attached decision. 
                                                 
13
 Article 3(5 ) of Annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement. 
14
 It was decided to reserve €1.8 billion for the B envelopes for unforeseen needs under the 10
th
 EDF. This 
reserve should in particular cover emergency and humanitarian aid requirements under Articles 72 and 
73 of the Cotonou Agreement (including aid for post-crisis countries without signed strategy papers), 
contributions to debt relief initiatives, and Flex. The requirements for humanitarian and emergency aid 
additional to budgetary aid are estimated at about €150 to 200 million a year on the basis of an 
extrapolation of operations financed under the 9th EDF. The balance available for Flex is not therefore 
sufficient to satisfy all potential requirements, which are estimated at about €200 million. 
 EN 9   EN 
Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DECISION 
on the position to be adopted by the Community within the ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers regarding the revision of the terms and conditions of financing for short-term 
fluctuations in export earnings (Chapter 3 of Annex II to the ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular 
Article 310 in conjunction with the second subparagraph of Article 300(2) thereof, 
Having regard to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000
1
 
and revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005
2
 (hereinafter referred to as 'the ACP-EC 
Partnership Agreement'), 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Whereas: 
(1) Article 100 of the Partnership Agreement lays down that Annexes II, III, IV and VI of 
the Agreement may be revised, reviewed and/or amended by decision of the ACP-EC 
Council of Ministers on the basis of a recommendation from the ACP-EC 
Development Finance Cooperation Committee. 
(2) Article 11 of Chapter 3 of Annex II to the Agreement lays down that the Chapter shall 
be subject to review at the latest after two years of operation and subsequently at the 
request of either Party. 
(3) The system of support to mitigate the adverse effects of any instability in export 
earnings was amended for the first time by Decision No 2/2004 of the ACP-EC 
Council of Ministers of 30 June 2004
3
. 
(4) At the signing of the revised ACP-EC Partnership Agreement in Luxembourg on 
25 June 2005, the parties made a joint declaration that: "The ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers will examine, in application of the provisions contained in Article 100 of the 
Cotonou Agreement, the proposals of the ACP side concerning Annex II thereof on 
short-term fluctuations in export earnings"
4
. 
                                                 
1
 OJ L 317, 15.12.2000. 
2
 OJ L 287, 28.10.2005. 
3
 OJ L 297, 22.9.2004, p. 18. 
4
 Declaration II, Joint declaration on Article 68 of the Cotonou Agreement, OJ L 287, 28.10.2005, p. 37. 
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(5) The position of the Community within the ACP-EC Council of Ministers regarding the 
revision of Chapter 3 of Annex II to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement covering the 
terms and conditions of financing for short-term fluctuations in export earnings needs 
to be established. 
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: 
Sole Article 
The Community shall adopt a position within the ACP-EC Council of Ministers regarding the 
revision of the terms and conditions of financing for short-term fluctuations in export earnings 
on the basis of the draft decision of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers at annex. 
Minor changes may be made to this draft decision without a new Council Decision being 
necessary. 
Done at Brussels, […] 
 For the Council 
 The President 
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ANNEX  
Draft 
DECISION OF THE ACP-EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
regarding the revision of the terms and conditions of financing for short-term 
fluctuations in export earnings (Chapter 3 of Annex II to the ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement) 
THE ACP-EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, 
Having regard to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2007
1
 
and revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005
2
 (hereinafter referred to as 'the ACP-EC 
Partnership Agreement'), and in particular Article 100 thereof, 
Whereas: 
(1) The signatory countries of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, aware that the 
instability of export earnings could be prejudicial to the development of the ACP 
States, have set up a system of additional support to mitigate the adverse effects of any 
instability in export earnings, including those of the agricultural and mining sectors; 
they confirm that the aim of this support is to safeguard socio-economic reforms and 
policies that could be affected negatively as a result of a drop in export revenue and to 
remedy the adverse effects of instability of export earnings, in particular from 
agricultural and mining products
3
. 
(2) In accordance with Article 11 of Annex II to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, the 
provisions of Chapter 3 of that Annex covering the terms and conditions of the 
financing of short-term fluctuations in export earnings are subject to review at the 
latest after two years and subsequently at the request of either party. 
(3) The system of support to mitigate the adverse effects of any instability in export 
earnings was amended for the first time by Decision No 2/2004 of the ACP-EC 
Council of Ministers of 30 June 2004
4
. 
(4) At the signing of the revised ACP-EC Partnership Agreement in Luxembourg on 
25 June 2005, the parties made a joint declaration that: "The ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers will examine, in application of the provisions contained in Article 100 of the 
Cotonou Agreement, the proposals of the ACP side concerning Annex II thereof on 
short-term fluctuations in export earnings"
5
. 
                                                 
1
 OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3. 
2
 OJ L 287, 28.10.2005, p. 1. 
3
 Article 68 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. 
4
 OJ L 297, 22.9.2004, p. 18. 
5
 Declaration II, Joint declaration on Article 68 of the Cotonou Agreement, OJ L 287, 28.10.2005, p. 37. 
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(5) It is necessary to improve the functioning of the system of financing for short-term 
fluctuations in export earnings so as to respond more adequately to its objectives, 
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: 
Article 1 
Chapter 3 of Annex II to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement is amended as follows: 
1. Article 9, paragraph 1 of the annex is replaced by the following: 
1. Eligibility for additional resources shall be established by: 
- a 10% (2% in the case of least-developed, landlocked, island, post-conflict and 
post-natural disaster States) loss of export earnings from goods compared with the 
arithmetical average of the earnings in the four years preceding the application year, 
excluding the most extreme value; or 
- a 10% (2% in the case of least-developed, landlocked, island, post-conflict and post 
natural disaster States) loss of export earnings from the total of agricultural or 
mineral products compared with the arithmetical average of the earnings in the four 
years preceding the application year, excluding the most extreme value for countries 
where the agricultural or mineral export revenues represent more than 40 % of total 
export revenues from goods;" 
2. Article 9, paragraph 2 of the annex is replaced by the following: 
"2. The loss of export earnings referred to in paragraph 1 must be 0.7% of GDP or 
more for there to be entitlement to additional support. Entitlement to additional 
support shall be limited to three successive years.”  
3. Article 9, paragraph 3 of the annex is replaced by the following: 
"3. The additional resources shall be reflected in the public accounts of the country 
concerned. They shall be utilised in accordance with programming rules and 
methods, including the specific provisions of Annex IV "Implementation and 
management procedures", on the basis of agreements drawn up in advance between 
the Community and the ACP State concerned in the year following the application 
year. By agreement of both Parties the resources may be used to finance programmes 
included in the national budget. However, a part of the additional resources may also 
be set aside for specific sectors, in particular to develop market-based insurance 
schemes offering protection against the risk of fluctuations in export earnings."  
4. An Article 9a is added to Chapter 3 of Annex II: 
"1. The amount of additional financial support is equal to the loss of export earnings 
multiplied by the arithmetic mean of the "government revenue/gross domestic 
product" ratio of the four years preceding the application year, excluding the most 
extreme value and capping that ratio at 25%. 
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2. The Commission will analyse the data provided by the ACP States for the purpose 
of establishing eligibility and additional financial support as defined in Article 9 in 
the local currency corrected for inflation. The Commission will then convert the 
potential amount of additional financial support into euro in accordance with its 
procedures. 
3. Each year, within the total financial allocation for NIPs, the Commission will 
establish an envelope covering all ACP countries to provide support in the event of 
short-term fluctuations in export earnings. If the amount of financial support 
calculated on the basis of the criteria set out in Article 9 exceeds the amount of that 
envelope, each ACP State's share will be established in proportion to the potential 
amount of its additional financial support expressed in euro. » 
5. Article 10 of the annex is replaced by the following: 
"The system for allocating additional resources shall provide for advances to cover 
any delays in obtaining consolidated trade statistics and to ensure that the resources 
in question can be included in the budget of the second year following the 
application year at the latest. Advances shall be reserved for States where Flex 
financial support can be implemented by means of general budgetary support. They 
shall be mobilised on the basis of provisional export statistics drawn up by the 
government and submitted to the Commission. The maximum advance shall be 100 
% of the amount of additional financial support for the application year. The amounts 
thus mobilised shall be adjusted in the light of the final consolidated export statistics. 
These statistics must be submitted no later than 31 December of the second year 
following the application year."  
Article 2 
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption. 
Done at 
For the ACP-EC Council of Ministers 
The President 
